Giorgio Farace

farace@uchicago.edu

University of Chicago
Harris School of Public Policy
& Department of Political Science

EDUCATION	**University of Chicago**, PhD in Political Economy Specializations: formal theory and comparative politics *Passed qualifying exams; Prospectus defense scheduled by Fall 2024*	2021–2026
	University of Oxford MPhil in Politics [Comparative Government] *(Distinction)*	2019–2021
	Università Bocconi, Milan (Italy) BSc in International Politics *&* Government *(110/110 cum laude)*	2016-2019
	Cornell University, undergraduate exchange student	Spring 2019

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS	*Election Technologies & Welfare* Elections affect citizen welfare by solving the interrelated problems of selecting good rulers, incentivizing good government, and ensuring peace. A growing literature studies the informational role of elections, modeling them as (more or less truthful) public signals of citizen preferences. In this paper I allow the distribution of citizen preferences to be determined endogenously by ruler effort, and I show that restricting the ruler to a truthful election has varied effects on citizen welfare, as it can decrease ruler effort while increasing the citizen's ability of replacing her with a better opposition.	2024
	Repression via Collective Punishment A ruler maximizes obedience in a population of citizens with heterogeneous loyalty. Citizens are embedded in a weighted network, the intensity of a link between two citizens capturing the degree to which they may affect each other's payoffs. In an environment of perfect information, the ruler punishes some citizens for others' disobedience so as to create incentives for citizens to repress each other. This provides a strategic rationale for the intentional punishment of innocents.	2023
	Consistent Constitutions This article presents a general possibility theorem for *constitutions*, social aggregators which always generate a non-empty "top set" of alternatives that are ranked at least as highly as any other. Using increasingly restrictive notions of *consistency*, or collective rationality, I generalize and unify many classic results, including the oligarchy theorem of Mas Colell and Sonnenschein and the dictatorship theorems of Arrow, Gibbard–Satterthwaite, and Eliaz.	2023

AWARDS	*ESCR Grand Union Doctoral Training Partnership* Full funding for MPhil & DPhil in Politics at Oxford	2019–2021
	Merton College Scholarship Full living stipend, joint with ESRC	2019–2021

TEACHING	*Analytical Politics II* (Head TA) Harris School, University of Chicago	Winter 2023–2024
	Intro to Comparative Politics (TA) Department of Political Science, University of Chicago	Fall 2023
	Analytical Politics I (TA) Harris School, University of Chicago	Fall 2022
RA WORK	Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (Chicago)	2024
	Ethan Bueno de Mesquita *&* Wiola Dziuda (Chicago)	2023
	Alex Kuo (Oxford)	2019–2020
	Massimo Morelli (Bocconi)	2018–2019
LANGUAGES: NATURAL; ARTIFICIAL	Italian (native), English (fluent: CEFR C2), Spanish (intermediate: CEFR B2), French (intermediate: CEFR B1); R, Stata, LATEX.	